7th Circuit says texts exempt from TCPA ban

By Samantha Ward 06/08/2026 2 min read 23 views

The Seventh Circuit on July 14, 2026 issued the first appellate ruling that text messages do not fall under the “telephone call” provision of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act’s (TCPA) do‑not‑call clause, a decision that reshapes how courts will evaluate bulk‑text lawsuits.

Court’s Reasoning Focuses on Statutory Language

In Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, the appellate panel examined Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA, which creates a private right of action for recipients of “more than one telephone call” within a year. The statute contains no definition that expands “telephone call” to include text messages. The judges noted that surrounding subsections consistently distinguish “telephone solicitation” from “message,” implying Congress intended different categories of communication.

Applying the meaningful‑variation canon, the panel inferred that Congress deliberately used the narrower term “telephone call” in § 227(c)(5). They also cited the act’s fax provision, § 227(d)(1), to show that lawmakers already recognized text‑based communications as “messages,” not “calls.” A 2018 amendment expressly defined “text message” in § 227(e) while leaving § 227(c)(5) untouched, reinforcing the view that the latter does not cover texts.

Historical Context and Recent Judicial Shifts

The ruling follows the Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates v. McKesson Corp., which curtailed the deference courts gave to the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) interpretation that texts qualify as calls. Earlier cases had relied on the FCC’s stance, anchored in the Chevron framework that allowed agencies to shape ambiguous statutes. The Court’s 2024 opinion in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo formally rejected that framework, urging courts to interpret statutes independently.

By focusing on the plain meaning of “telephone call” at the time of enactment in 1991, the Seventh Circuit highlighted that the term referred to voice communication over a telephone line. The court pointed out that contemporary usage may blur the distinction, but statutory interpretation looks to original meaning, not evolving slang.

Other circuits remain divided. The Ninth Circuit, in Howard v. Republican National Committee, held that a text message qualifies as a “call” under a different TCPA provision, § 227(b)(1). That decision, however, involved separate statutory language and did not directly address the scope of § 227(c)(5).

The Steidinger decision marks an important moment for TCPA litigation, especially for defendants who have faced class actions alleging violations based on unsolicited texts. By challenging the applicability of § 227(c)(5) to text messages, businesses may limit exposure to statutory damages that range from $500 to $1,500 per violation.

While the ruling does not affect other TCPA provisions covering autodialed or prerecorded‑voice calls, it opens a new avenue for legal arguments centered on the text of the statute itself. The decision may prompt further appeals and could eventually reach the Supreme Court for a definitive resolution on whether the term “telephone call” ever encompassed text messaging.

The ruling could reshape future cases.