Court unanimously sides with defendant in venue dispute over crime location

By Jessica Turner 14/06/2026 3 min read 14 views

The Supreme Court ruled unanimously on Thursday in Abouammo v. United States that federal prosecutors must try defendants in the district where a crime was physically committed, not where its effects are felt. Justice Elena Kagan wrote the nine-page opinion, which rejected the government’s argument that the intent behind a crime could shift where it is legally considered to occur.

Ahmad Abouammo was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1519, a law criminalizing the falsification of documents in federal investigations. Prosecutors claimed he created a fake invoice on his computer in Seattle and emailed it to FBI agents during an investigation into Twitter employees’ access to private user data. Abouammo had worked at Twitter’s San Francisco office, where he allegedly used internal tools to obtain information about Saudi dissidents and shared it with a royal court official in exchange for cash and a luxury watch.

Abouammo moved to Seattle in 2015 and later fabricated the invoice while being interviewed by FBI agents in a Seattle hotel. He sent the document to the agents. The government prosecuted him there, but Abouammo argued the crime was completed in Seattle, where the falsification occurred.

Kagan emphasized the constitutional right to a trial in the district where a crime is committed. She wrote that the Constitution reinforces this rule in Article III and the Sixth Amendment, both of which tie trial locations to where crimes are physically committed.

For Section 1519, Kagan wrote, the “essential conduct” is the act of falsifying a document, not its consequences. The law criminalizes the creation of a false record “with the intent to impede” an investigation. Once that act is completed, the crime is finished. “The only prohibited act in that statute is the falsification of a document,” Kagan noted. “Once a person has committed that act (with the requisite intent), he need do nothing more to violate the law.”

The government argued that the intent requirement meant the crime’s “contemplated effects” could be considered part of the offense. Kagan rejected this, stating the Court has never linked venue to a statute’s mens rea elements. “This Court has never looked to a statute’s mens rea elements in considering venue,” she wrote. “Nor would it make much sense to do so.”

The government also tried comparing Section 1519 to conspiracy charges, which can be prosecuted where an “overt act” occurs. Kagan countered that Section 1519 is an independent crime, not an inchoate offense. “§1519 spells out a standalone crime for falsifying documents,” she wrote. “Venue for it must be based on the conduct that §1519 itself proscribes, not on the conduct another law does.”

The trial for falsifying a document must take place where the defendant falsified the document, Kagan concluded. “Here that was in Seattle—meaning in venue terms, the Western District of Washington. The trial should not have occurred in the Northern District of California because no ‘conduct constituting the offense’ happened in that location.”

The text and history of Section 1519 clearly support the defendant’s position, Kagan stressed. “The only prohibited act in that statute is the falsification of a document,” she wrote. “Once a person has committed that act (with the requisite intent), he need do nothing more to violate the law.”